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Abstract
Image classifiers are typically scored on their test set ac-
curacy, but high accuracy can mask a subtle type of model
failure. We find that high scoring convolutional neural net-
works (CNN) exhibit troubling pathologies that allow them
to display high accuracy even in the absence of semantically
salient features. When a model provides a high-confidence
decision without salient supporting input features we say
that the classifier has overinterpreted its input, finding too
much class-evidence in patterns that appear nonsensical to
humans. Here, we demonstrate that state of the art neural
networks for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet suffer from overin-
terpretation, and find CIFAR-10 trained models make confi-
dent predictions even when 95% of an input image has been
masked and humans are unable to discern salient features in
the remaining pixel subset. Although these patterns portend
potential model fragility in real-world deployment, they are
in fact valid statistical patterns of the image classification
benchmark that alone suffice to attain high test accuracy.
We find that ensembling strategies can help mitigate model
overinterpretation, and classifiers which rely on more se-
mantically meaningful features can improve accuracy over
both the test set and out-of-distribution images from a dif-
ferent source than the training data.
1. Introduction
Well-founded decisions by machine learning (ML) sys-
tems are critical for high-stakes applications such as au-
tonomous vehicles and medical diagnosis. Pathologies in
models and their respective training datasets can result in
unintended behavior during deployment if the systems are
confronted with novel situations. For example, a recent
medical image classifier for cancer detection attained high
accuracy in benchmark test data, but was found to base
its decision upon the presence of dermatologists’ rulers in
an image (present when dermatologists already suspected
cancer) [24]. We define model overinterpretation to occur
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when a classifier finds strong class-evidence in regions of an
image that contain no semantically salient features. Over-
interpretation is related to overfitting, but overfitting can be
diagnosed via reduced test accuracy. Overinterpretation can
stem from true statistical signals in the underlying dataset
distribution that happen to arise from particular properties
of the data source (such as the dermatologists’ rulers). Thus,
overinterpretation can be harder to diagnose as it admits de-
cisions that are made by statistically valid criteria, and mod-
els that use such criteria can excel at benchmarks.
It is important to understand how hidden statistical sig-
nals of benchmark datasets can result in models that over-
interpret or do not generalize to examples that stem from
a different distribution. Computer vision (CV) research re-
lies upon datasets like CIFAR-10 [18] and ImageNet [28]
to provide standardized performance benchmarks. Here, we
analyze the overinterpretation of popular CNN architectures
derived from these benchmarks to characterize pathologies.
Revealing overinterpretation requires a systematic way
to identify which features are used by a model to reach its
decision. Feature attribution is addressed by a large number
of interpretability methods, although they propose differing
explanations for the decisions of a model. One natural ex-
planation for image classification lies in the set of pixels that
is sufficient for the model to make a confident prediction,
even in the absence of information regarding what is con-
tained in the rest of the image. In our example of the medi-
cal image classifier for cancer detection, one might identify
the pathological behavior by realizing the pixels depicting
the ruler alone suffice for the model to confidently output
the same classifications. This idea of Sufficient Input Sub-
sets (SIS) has been proposed to help humans interpret the
decisions of black-box models [4]. An SIS subset consists
of the smallest subset of features (e.g., pixels) that suffices
to yield a class probability above a certain threshold after
all other features have been masked.
Here we demonstrate that models trained on CIFAR-
10 and ImageNet can base their classification decisions on
sufficient input subsets that only contain few pixels and
lack human understandable semantic content. Nevertheless,
these sufficient input subsets contain statistical signals that
generalize across the benchmark data distribution, and we
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are able to train equally performing classifiers on CIFAR-
10 images that have lost 95% of their pixels. Thus, there
exist inherent statistical shortcuts in this benchmark that a
classifier solely optimized for accuracy can learn to exploit,
instead of having to learn all of the complex semantic rela-
tionships between the image pixels and the assigned class
label. While recent work suggests adversarially robust clas-
sifiers rely on more semantically meaningful features [13],
we find these models suffer from severe overinterpretation
as well. As we subsequently show, overinterpretation is not
only a conceptual issue, but can actually harm overall clas-
sifier performance in practice. We find that single ensem-
bling of multiple networks can mitigate overinterpretation,
increasing the semantic content of the resulting SIS subsets.
Intriguingly, the number of pixels in the SIS rationale be-
hind a particular classification is often indicative of whether
this image will be classified correctly or not.
It may seem unnatural to use an interpretability method
that produces feature attributions which look uninter-
pretable. However, we do not want to bias extracted ratio-
nales towards human visual priors when analyzing a model
for its pathologies, but rather want to faithfully report ex-
actly those features used by a model. To our knowledge,
this is the first analysis which shows that one can extract
nonsensical features from CIFAR-10 that intuitively should
be insufficient or irrelevant for a confident prediction, yet
these features alone are sufficient to train a classifier with a
minimal loss of performance.
2. Related Work
There has been substantial research on understanding
dataset bias in CV [35, 36] and the fragility of image clas-
sifiers when applied outside of the benchmark setting [26].
CNNs for image classification in particular have been con-
jectured to pick up on localized features like texture instead
of more global features like object shape [3, 6]. Other re-
search on deep image classifiers has also argued they heav-
ily rely on nonsensical patterns [14, 20], and investigated
this issue with artificially-generated patterns that are not in
the original benchmark dataset. In contrast, we demonstrate
the pathology of overinterpretation with unmodified subsets
of actual training images, indicating the patterns are already
present in the original dataset. Like us, [12] also recently
found that sparse pixel subsets suffice to attain high classi-
fication accuracy on popular image classification datasets.
In natural language processing (NLP) applications, there
has been a recent effort to explore model pathologies us-
ing a similar technique [5], but this work does not analyze
whether the semantically spurious patterns the models rely
on are a statistical property of the dataset. Other research
has demonstrated the presence spurious statistical shortcuts
present in major NLP benchmarks, showing this problem is
not unique to CV [21].
3. Methods
3.1. Data
CIFAR-10 [18] and ImageNet [29] have become two of
the most popular image classification benchmarks. Nowa-
days, most classifiers are evaluated by the CV community
based on their accuracy in one of these benchmarks.
We employ two additional datasets to evaluate the extent
to which our CIFAR-10 models can generalize to out-of-
distribution (OOD) images that stem from a different source
than the training data. First, we use the CIFAR-10.1 v6
dataset [25], which contains 2000 class-balanced images
drawn from the Tiny Images repository [37] in a similar
fashion to that of CIFAR-10, though the authors of [25]
found a large drop in classification accuracy on these im-
ages. Additionally, we use the CIFAR-10-C dataset [11],
which contains variants of CIFAR-10 test images altered by
various corruptions (such as Gaussian noise, motion blur,
and snow). Where computing sufficient input subsets on
CIFAR-10-C images, we use a uniform random sample of
2000 images from the CIFAR-10-C set.
3.2. Models
For CIFAR-10, we explore three common CNN ar-
chitectures: a deep residual network with depth 20
(ResNet20) [9], a v2 deep residual network with depth 18
(ResNet18) [10], and VGG16 [31]. We train these classi-
fiers using cross-entropy loss optimized via SGD with Nes-
terov momentum [33] and employ standard data augmenta-
tion consisting of random crops and horizontal flips (addi-
tional details in Section S1). After training many CIFAR-10
networks individually, we construct four different ensem-
ble classifiers by grouping various networks together. Each
ensemble outputs the average prediction over its member
networks (specifically, the arithmetic mean of their logits).
For each of three architectures, we create a corresponding
homogeneous ensemble by individually training five copies
of networks that share the same architecture. Each net-
work has a different random initialization, which suffices
to produce substantially-different models despite the fact
these replicate architectures are all trained on the same data
[22]. Our fourth ensemble is heterogeneous, containing all
15 networks (5 replicates of each of 3 distinct CNN archi-
tectures).
For ImageNet, we use a pre-trained Inception-v3
model [34] available in PyTorch [23]. This network
achieves 22.55% and 6.44% top-1 and top-5 error on Im-
ageNet, respectively [23].
3.3. Interpreting Learned Features
We interpret the feature patterns learned by our models
using the sufficient input subsets (SIS) procedure [4], which
produces rationales of a pre-trained model’s decision-
making by applying backward selection locally on individ-
ual examples. These rationales are comprised of sparse sub-
sets of input features (pixels) on which the model makes the
same decision as on the original input (with the rest of pix-
els masked), up to a specified confidence threshold.
More formally, let 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 be a threshold for predic-
tion confidence. Let f predict that an image x belongs to
class c with probability fc. Let U be the total set of pixels.
Then an SIS subset S ⊆ U is a minimal subset of pixels
such that fc(xS) ≥ τ where the information about the pix-
els R = U \ S is considered to be missing. We mask pixels
in R by replacement with the mean pixel value over the en-
tire image dataset (equal to zero when the image data has
been normalized), which is presumably least informative to
a trained classifier [4]. We apply SIS to the function giv-
ing the confidence toward the predicted (most likely) class.
We also develop an approximation of the backward selec-
tion procedure to efficiently scale the SIS-finding procedure
to higher-resolution images from ImageNet (details in Sec-
tion S5).
We produce sparse variants of CIFAR-10 images where
we retain the values of 5% of pixels in the image, while
masking the remainder. Our goal is to identify sparse pixel
subsets that contain feature patterns the model identifies as
strong class-evidence as it classifies an image. We iden-
tify such pixel-subsets by local backward selection on each
image as in the BackSelect procedure of SIS [4]. We
apply backward selection to fc, which iteratively removes
pixels that lead to the smallest decrease in fc. Our 5% pixel-
subset images contain the final 5% of pixels as ordered by
backward selection (with their same RGB values as in the
original image) while all other pixels’ values are replaced
with zero.
3.4. Human Classification Benchmark
To evaluate whether sparse pixel-subsets of images can
be accurately classified by humans, we asked four par-
ticipants to classify images containing various degrees of
masking. We randomly sampled 100 images from the
CIFAR-10 test set (10 images per class) that were correctly
and confidently (≥ 99% confidence) classified by our mod-
els, and for each image, kept only 5%, 30%, or 50% of
pixels as ranked by backward selection (all other pixels
masked). Backward selection image subsets are sampled
across our three models. Since larger subsets of pixels are
by construction supersets of smaller subsets identified by
the same model, we presented each batch of 100 images in
order of increasing subset size and shuffled the order of im-
ages within each batch. Users were asked to classify each
of the 300 images as one of the 10 classes in CIFAR-10
and were not provided training images. The same task was
given to each user (and is provided in Section S4).
4. Results
4.1. CNNs Classify Images Using Spurious Features
We train five replicate models of each of our three archi-
tectures (ResNet20, ResNet18, VGG16) on the CIFAR-10
training set (see Section 3.2). Table 1 shows the final model
accuracies on the CIFAR-10 test set and CIFAR-10.1 and
CIFAR-10-C (out-of-distribution) test sets.
To interpret the behavior of these models, we apply the
sufficient input subset (SIS) interpretability procedure [4]
to identify minimal subsets of features in each image that
suffice for the model to make the same prediction as on
the full image (see Section 3.3). For SIS, we use a con-
fidence threshold of 0.99 and mask pixels by replacement
with zeros. Figure 1 shows examples of sufficient input
subsets from a randomly chosen set of CIFAR-10 test im-
ages, which are confidently and correctly classified by each
model (additional examples in Section S2). Each SIS shown
is classified by its corresponding model with ≥ 99% confi-
dence toward the predicted class. This result suggests that
our CNNs confidently predict on images that appear non-
sensical to humans (see Section 4.3), which leads to concern
about their robustness and generalizability.
We observe that these sufficient input subsets are highly
sparse and that the average SIS size at this threshold is
< 5% of each image, so we create a sparsified variant of all
CIFAR-10 images (both train and test). As in SIS, we apply
backward selection locally on each image to rank pixels by
their contribution to the predicted class (as described in Sec-
tion 3.3). We retain 5% of pixels as ordered by backward se-
lection on each image and mask the remaining 95% with ze-
ros. Note that because backward selection is applied locally
on each image, the specific pixels retained differ across im-
ages.
We first verify that the original models are able to clas-
sify these sparsified images just as accurately as their full
image counterparts (Table 1). Moreover, the predictions on
the pixel-subsets are just as confident: the mean drop in
confidence for the predicted class between original images
and these 5% subsets is −0.035 (std dev. = 0.107), −0.016
(0.094), and −0.012 (0.074) computed over all CIFAR-10
test images for our ResNet20, ResNet18, and VGG16 mod-
els, respectively, which suggests severe overinterpretation
by each model (negative values imply greater confidence
on the 5% subsets). We also find that these pixel sub-
sets chosen through backward selection are more predictive
than equally large pixel-subsets chosen uniformly at ran-
dom from each image (Table 1), on which the models are
unable to predict as accurately as on the original images or
on the pixel-subsets found through backward selection. Fig-
ure 2 shows the frequency of each pixel location in the 5%
backward selection pixel-subsets derived from each model
across all CIFAR-10 test images.
airplane automobile bird cat deer dog frog horse ship truck
Re
sN
et
18
Re
sN
et
20
VG
G1
6
Ad
v.
 R
ob
us
t
Figure 1: Sufficient input subsets (SIS) for a sample of CIFAR-10 test images (top). Each SIS image shown below is
classified by the respective model with ≥ 99% confidence. The “Adv. Robust” (pre-trained adversarially robust) model we
use is from [19] and robust to l∞ perturbations.
We additionally find that the SIS subsets for one model
do not transfer to other models. That is, a sparse pixel sub-
set which one model confidently classified is typically not
confidently identified by the other models. For instance,
5% pixel-subsets derived from CIFAR-10 test images using
one ResNet18 model (which classifies them with 94.8% ac-
curacy) are only classified with 27.6%, 29.2%, and 27.5%
accuracy by another ResNet18 replicate, ResNet20, and
VGG16 models, respectively. This result suggests there ex-
ist many different statistical patterns that a flexible model
might learn to rely on, and thus CIFAR-10 image classi-
fication remains a highly under-determined problem. Pro-
ducing high-capacity classifiers that make the right predic-
tions for the right reasons may require clever regularization
strategies and architecture design to ensure the model favors
salient features over such sparse pixel subsets.
4.1.1 Analysis on ImageNet
We also find that models trained on the higher-resolution
images from ImageNet suffer from severe overinterpreta-
tion. As it is computationally infeasible to scale the original
backward selection procedure of SIS [4] to ImageNet, we
introduce a more efficient gradient-based approximation to
the original SIS procedure that enables us to find sufficient
input subsets on ImageNet images (details in Section S5).
Figure 3 shows examples of images confidently classified
Figure 2: Heatmaps of pixel locations comprising 5% pixel-
subsets across CIFAR-10 test set for each model. Frequency
indicates fraction of subsets containing each pixel. Mean
confidence indicates confidence on 5% pixel-subsets.
by Inception-v3, along with the corresponding SIS subsets
that identify which pixels alone suffice to for the network to
reach a similarly confident prediction (additional examples
are provided in Figure S6). These sufficient input subsets
appear visually nonsensical, yet the network nevertheless
classifies them with ≥ 90% confidence. Of great concern
is the fact that nearly none of the SIS pixels are located
within the actual object that determines the class label. For
example, in the “pizza” image, the SIS is concentrated on
the shape of the plate and the background table, rather than
the pizza itself, which indicates that the model could gen-
eralize poorly when the image contains a different circu-
lar item on the table. In the “giant panda” image, the SIS
Model Train On Evaluate On CIFAR-10 Test Acc. CIFAR-10.1 Acc. CIFAR-10-C Acc.
ResNet20
Full Images
Full Images 92.23± 0.35 83.85± 0.75 69.99± 0.67
5% BS Subsets 92.48 82.80 70.65
5% Random 9.99± 0.07 10.01± 0.02 10.03± 0.03
5% BS Subsets 5% BS Subsets 92.50± 0.02 82.74± 0.02 70.57± 0.08
5% Random 5% Random 50.05± 0.18 39.53± 0.24 43.89± 0.15
ResNet18
Full Images
Full Images 95.28± 0.17 89.07± 0.70 75.28± 0.51
5% BS Subsets 94.76 89.35 75.15
5% Random 10.01± 0.15 10.08± 0.12 10.02± 0.08
5% BS Subsets 5% BS Subsets 94.97± 0.04 89.57± 0.08 75.27± 0.08
5% Random 5% Random 51.20± 0.78 39.79± 1.18 44.77± 0.56
VGG16
Full Images
Full Images 93.62± 0.10 86.07± 0.59 73.96± 0.59
5% BS Subsets 93.27 86.45 73.95
5% Random 9.97± 0.17 10.02± 0.24 10.08± 0.12
5% BS Subsets 5% BS Subsets 92.56± 0.05 85.65± 0.16 73.26± 0.22
5% Random 5% Random 53.80± 1.31 41.32± 1.30 47.19± 1.02
Ensemble
(5x ResNet18) Full Images
Full Images 96.15 90.50 77.21
5% Random 9.98 10.00 10.00
Table 1: Accuracy of various models on CIFAR-10 images trained and evaluated on full images, 5% backward selection
(BS) pixel-subsets, and 5% randomly chosen pixel-subsets. Where possible, we report accuracy given as mean ± standard
deviation (%) over five runs. For training/evaluation on BS pixel-subsets, we only run backward selection on all CIFAR-10
images for a single model of each type, but average over five models trained on these subsets.
contains bamboo, which likely appeared in the collection
of ImageNet photos for this class. In the “traffic light” and
“street sign” images, the SIS is focused on the sky, sug-
gesting that autonomous vehicle systems that may depend
on these models should be carefully evaluated for overinter-
pretation pathologies.
We randomly sample 1000 images from the ImageNet
validation set that are classified with ≥ 90% confidence
and generate a heatmap of sufficient input subset pixel lo-
cations (Figure 4). Here, we use SIS subsets to generate the
heatmap rather than 5% pixel-subsets. The SIS tend to be
strongly concentrated along the image borders rather than
near the center, suggesting the model relies too heavily on
image backgrounds in its decision-making. This is a se-
rious problem because objects corresponding to ImageNet
classes are often located near the center of images, and thus
this network fails to focus on salient features. The fact that
the model confidently classifies the majority of images by
seeing only their border pixels suggests it suffers from se-
vere overinterpretation.
4.2. Sparse Subsets are Real Statistical Patterns
CNNs are known to be overconfident for image classifi-
cation [8]. Thus one might reasonably wonder whether the
overconfidence on the semantically meaningless SIS sub-
sets is an artifact of CNN overconfidence rather than a true
statistical signal in the dataset. To probe this question, we
evaluate whether the CIFAR-10 sparse 5% image subsets
contain sufficient information to train a new classifier to
solve the same task. We run our backward selection pro-
cedure on all train and test images in CIFAR-10 using one
of our three model architectures (chosen at random). We
then train a new model of the same type on these 5% pixel-
subset variants of the CIFAR-10 training images. We use
the same training setup and hyperparameters as with the
original models (see Section 3.2) without data augmentation
of training images (results with data augmentation in Sec-
tion S3). Note that we apply backward selection to the func-
tion giving the confidence of the predicted class from the
original model, which prevents leaking information about
the true class for misclassified images, and we use the true
labels for training new models on pixel-subsets. As a base-
line to the 5% pixel-subsets identified by backward selec-
tion, we create variants of all CIFAR-10 images where the
5% pixel-subsets are selected at random from each image
(rather than by backward selection). We use the same ran-
dom pixel-subsets for training each new model.
As shown in Table 1, models trained solely on these 5%
backward selection image subsets can classify correspond-
ing 5% test image subsets nearly as accurately as mod-
els trained and evaluated on full images. Models trained
on random 5% pixel-subsets of images have significantly
lower accuracy on test images (Table 1) compared to mod-
els trained on 5% pixel-subsets found through backward
Figure 3: Sufficient input subsets for images from the ImageNet validation set (top). The middle row shows the location of
the SIS pixels (red) and the bottom row shows the image with all pixels outside of the SIS masked, which is still classified by
the Inception-v3 model with ≥ 90% confidence.
Figure 4: Heatmap of pixel locations comprising sufficient
input subsets (threshold 0.9) across ImageNet validation
images from Inception-v3. Frequency indicates fraction of
SIS containing each pixel.
selection of existing models. This result suggests that the
highly sparse subsets found through backward selection of-
fer a valid predictive signal in the CIFAR-10 benchmark
that can be exploited by models to attain high test accuracy.
4.3. Humans Struggle to Classify Sparse Subsets
Table 2 shows the accuracy achieved by humans asked
to classify our sparse pixel subsets (Section 3.4). Unsur-
prisingly, there is strong correlation between the fraction of
unmasked pixels in each image and human classification ac-
curacy. Human classification accuracy on pixel subsets of
CIFAR-10 is significantly lower than accuracy when pre-
sented original, unmasked images (estimated around 94%
in previous work [16]). Moreover, human accuracy on 5%
pixel-subsets is very poor, though greater than purely ran-
dom guessing. Presumably this effect is due to correlations
between features such as color in images (for example, blue
pixels near the top of an image may indicate a sky, and
hence increase likelihood for certain CIFAR-10 classes such
as airplane, ship, and bird).
However, CNNs (even when trained on full images to
achieve accuracy on par with human accuracy on full im-
ages) can classify these sparse image subsets with very high
accuracy (Table 1, Section 4.2). This indicates the bench-
mark images contain statistical signals that are unknown
to humans. Models solely trained to minimize prediction
error may thus latch onto these signals while still accu-
rately generalizing to the test set, but such models may
behave counterintuitively when fed images from a differ-
ent source which does not share these exact statistics. The
strong correlation (R2 = 0.94, Figure S5) between the size
of pixel subsets found through backward selection and the
corresponding human classification accuracy clearly sug-
gests that larger subsets contain greater semantic content
and more salient features. Thus, a model whose confident
classifications have corresponding sufficient input subsets
that are larger in size is presumably better than a model with
smaller SIS subsets, as the former model exhibits less over-
interpretation. We investigate this further in Section 4.4.
Fraction of Images Human Classification Acc. (%)
5% 19.2± 4.8
30% 40.0± 2.5
50% 68.2± 3.6
Table 2: Human classification accuracy on a sample of
CIFAR-10 test image pixel-subsets of varying sparsity (see
Section 3.4). Accuracies given as mean ± standard devia-
tion.
4.4. SIS Size is Predictive of Model Accuracy
Given that smaller SIS contain fewer salient features ac-
cording to human classifiers, models that justify their classi-
fications based on these sparse SIS may be limited in terms
of attainable accuracy, particularly in out-of-distribution
settings. Here, we investigate the relationship between a
model’s predictive accuracy and the size of the SIS sub-
sets in which it identifies class-evidence. For each of our
three classifiers, we compute the average SIS size increase
for correctly classified images as compared to incorrectly
classified images (expressed as a percentage) for both the
CIFAR-10 test set and out-of-distribution CIFAR-10-C test
set. Figure 5 (A for CIFAR-10 test set, B for CIFAR-10-C
test set) shows that for varying SIS confidence thresholds,
SIS subsets of correctly classified images are consistently
significantly larger than those of misclassified images. This
is especially striking in light of the fact that model confi-
dence is uniformly lower on the misclassified inputs, as one
would hope (Figure S3). Lower confidence would normally
imply a larger SIS subset at a given confidence level, as one
expects that fewer pixels can be masked before the model’s
confidence drops below the SIS confidence threshold. Thus,
we can rule out overall model confidence as an explanation
of the smaller SIS in misclassified images. This result sug-
gests that the sparse SIS subsets highlighted in this paper
are not just a curiosity, but may be leading to bad general-
izations on real images.
We notice similar behavior by comparing SIS subset size
and model accuracy at varying confidence thresholds (Fig-
ure 6). Models with superior accuracy have higher SIS size
and thus tend to suffer less from model overinterpretation.
4.5. Pathologies in Adversarially Robust Models
Recent work has suggested semantics can be better cap-
tured via models that are robust to adversarial inputs, which
fool standard neural networks via human-imperceptible
modifications to images [19, 30]. Here, we find that mod-
els trained to be robust to adversarial attacks classify the
highly sparse sufficient input subsets as confidently as the
models in Section 4.1. We use a pre-trained wide resid-
ual network provided by [19] that is adversarially robust for
(a) CIFAR-10 test set
(b) CIFAR-10-C test set
Figure 5: Percentage increase in mean SIS size of cor-
rectly classified images compared to misclassified images
across (a) the CIFAR-10 test set and (b) a random sample of
CIFAR-10-C test set. Positive values indicate larger mean
SIS size for correctly classified images. Error bars indicate
95% confidence interval for the difference in means.
CIFAR-10 classification (trained against an iterative adver-
sary that can perturb each pixel by at most ε = 8). Figure 1
(“Adv. Robust”) shows examples of sufficient input subsets
identified for a sample of CIFAR-10 test images. The adver-
sarially robust model classifies each SIS image shown with
≥ 99% confidence. We find that the property of adversarial
robustness alone is insufficient to prevent models from over-
interpreting sparse feature patterns in CIFAR-10, and these
models confidently classify images that are indiscernible to
humans.
4.6. Ensembling Mitigates Overinterpretation
Model ensembling is a well-known technique to improve
classification performance [7, 15]. Here we test whether en-
sembling alleviates the overinterpretation problem as well.
We explore both homogeneous and heterogeneous ensem-
bles of our individual models (see Section 3.2). We show
that SIS subset size is strongly correlated with human accu-
racy on image classification (Section 4.3). Thus our metric
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Figure 6: Mean SIS size on CIFAR-10 test images as
SIS threshold varies. Corresponding model accuracies are
shown in the legend. SIS size indicates fraction of pixels
needed for model to make the same prediction at each con-
fidence. Shaded region indicates 95% confidence interval
around each mean.
for measuring how much ensembling can alleviate the prob-
lem is the increase in SIS subset size. Figure 6 shows that
ensembling uniformly increases the model accuracy which
is expected but also increases the SIS size (and given results
from Section 3.4 on humans), mitigating the overinterpreta-
tion problem.
We conjecture that the cause of both the increase in the
accuracy and SIS size for ensembles is the same. In our ex-
periments we observe that SIS pixel-subsets are generally
not transferable from one model to another — i.e., an SIS
for one model is rarely an SIS for another (see Section 4.1).
Thus, different models often consider independent pieces
of evidence to arrive at the same prediction. Ensembling
forces the consideration of the independent sources of evi-
dence together for its prediction, increasing the accuracy of
the prediction and forcing the SIS size to be larger by re-
quiring simultaneous activation of multiple independently
trained feature detectors. We find that the ensemble’s SIS
are larger than the SIS of its individual members (examples
in Figure S2).
5. Discussion
We find that state of the art image classifiers overinter-
pret small nonsensical patterns present in popular bench-
mark datasets, identifying strong class evidence in the pixel
subsets that constitute these patterns. Despite their lack
of salient features, these sparse pixel subsets are underly-
ing statistical signals that suffice to accurately generalize
from the benchmark training data to the benchmark test
data. We found that different models rationalize their pre-
dictions based on different sufficient input subsets, suggest-
ing that optimal image classification rules remain highly
underdetermined by the training data. Models with supe-
rior accuracy tend to suffer less from model overinterpre-
tation, which suggests that reducing overinterpretation can
lead to more accurate models. In high-stakes image clas-
sification applications, we recommend using ensembles of
diverse networks rather than relying on just a single model.
Our results call into question model interpretability
methods whose outputs are encouraged to align with prior
human beliefs regarding proper classifier operating behav-
ior [1]. Given the existence of non-salient pixel subsets
which alone suffice for correct classification, a model might
solely rely on those patterns in its predictions. In this
case, an interpretability method that faithfully describes the
model should output these nonsensical rationales, whereas
interpretability methods that bias rationales toward human
priors may produce results that mislead users to think their
models are behaving as intended.
Mitigating model overinterpretation and the broader task
of ensuring classifiers are accurate for the right reasons re-
main significant challenges for ML. While we discovered
ensembling tends to help, pathologies remain even for het-
erogeneous ensembles of classifiers. One alternative is to
regularize CNNs by constraining the pixel attributions gen-
erated via a saliency map [27, 32, 38]. Unfortunately, such
methods require a human image annotator that highlights
the correct pixels as an auxiliary supervision signal. Fur-
thermore, saliency maps have been shown to provide un-
reliable insights into the operating behavior of a classifier
and must be interpreted as approximations [17]. In contrast,
our SIS subsets constitute actual pathological examples that
have been misconstrued by the model.
Future work should investigate regularization strate-
gies and architectures to identify how to better learn
semantically-aligned features without explicit supervision.
Imposing the right inductive bias is critical given the issue
of underdetermination from multiple sets of non-salient pat-
terns that serve as valid statistical signals in benchmarks.
Before deploying current image classifiers in critical situa-
tions, it is imperative to assemble benchmarks composed of
a greater diversity of image sources in order to reduce the
likelihood of spurious statistical patterns [2].
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Supplementary Information for:
Overinterpretation reveals image classification model pathologies
S1. Details of Models and Training
Here we provide implementation and training details for the models used in this paper (Section 3.2). The ResNet20
architecture [9] has 16 initial filters and a total of 0.27M parameters. ResNet18 [10] has 64 initial filters and contains 11.2M
parameters. Our VGG16 architecture [31] uses batch normalization and contains 14.7M parameters.
All models are trained for 200 epochs with a batch size of 128. We minimize cross-entropy via SGD with Nesterov
momentum [33] using momentum of 0.9 and weight decay of 5e-4. The learning rate is initialized as 0.1 and is reduced by
a factor of 5 after epochs 60, 120, and 160. Datasets are normalized using per-channel mean and standard deviation, and we
use standard data augmentation training strategies [10].
The adversarially robust model we evaluated is the adv_trained model of [19], available on GitHub1.
To apply the SIS procedure to CIFAR-10 images, we use an implementation available on GitHub2. For confidently
classified images on which we run SIS, we find one sufficient input subset per image using the FindSIS procedure. When
masking pixels, we mask all channels of each pixel as a single feature.
S2. Additional Examples of CIFAR-10 Sufficient Input Subsets
SIS of Individual Networks
Figure S1 shows a sample of SIS for each of our three architectures. These images were randomly sampled among all
CIFAR-10 test images confidently (≥ 0.99) predicted to belong to the class written on the left. SIS are computed under a
threshold of 0.99, so all images shown in this figure are classified with probability ≥ 99% confidence as belonging to the
listed class.
1https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge
2https://github.com/google-research/google-research/blob/master/sufficient_input_subsets/sis.py
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Figure S1: Examples of SIS (threshold = 0.99) on random sample of CIFAR-10 test images (15 per class, different random
sample for each architecture). All images shown here are predicted to belong to the listed class with ≥ 99% confidence.
SIS of Ensemble
Figure S2 shows examples of SIS from one of our model ensembles (a homogeneous ensemble of ResNet18 networks, see
Section 3.2), along with corresponding SIS for the same image from each of the five member networks in the ensemble. We
use a SIS threshold of 0.99, so all images are classified with confidence ≥ 99%. These examples highlight how the ensemble
SIS are larger and draw class-evidence from the individual members’ SIS.
Figure S2: Examples of SIS from ResNet18 homogeneous ensemble (see Section 3.2) and its member models. Each row
shows original CIFAR-10 image (left), followed by SIS from the ensemble (second column) and the SIS from each of its 5
member networks (remaining columns). Each image shown is classified with ≥ 99% confidence by its respective network.
S3. Additional Model Performance Results
Training on Pixel-Subsets Without Data Augmentation
In Table S1, we present results akin to those in Section 4.2 and Table 1, but where the models here are trained on 5% pixel-
subsets are trained with data augmentation. We find that training without data augmentation slightly improves accuracy when
training models on 5% pixel-subsets.
Model Train On Evaluate On CIFAR-10 Test Acc. CIFAR-10.1 Acc. CIFAR-10-C Acc.
ResNet20 5% BS Subsets (+) 5% BS Subsets 92.23± 0.03 82.42± 0.12 70.33± 0.145% Random (+) 5% Random 48.85± 0.17 37.52± 0.30 42.58± 0.13
ResNet18 5% BS Subsets (+) 5% BS Subsets 94.67± 0.02 89.11± 0.13 75.00± 0.065% Random (+) 5% Random 48.69± 0.92 37.74± 0.97 42.77± 0.52
VGG16 5% BS Subsets (+) 5% BS Subsets 91.13± 0.12 84.07± 0.24 72.16± 0.195% Random (+) 5% Random 51.55± 1.14 39.96± 2.68 44.93± 1.05
Table S1: Performance of various models on CIFAR-10 images trained and evaluated on 5% backward selection (BS) image
subsets and 5% randomly chosen image subsets with data augmentation (+). Accuracy given as mean ± standard deviation
(%) over five runs. For results without data augmentation, see Table 1 in the main text.
Additional Analysis for SIS Size and Model Accuracy
Figure S3 shows the mean confidence of each group of correctly and incorrectly classified images that we consider at each
confidence threshold (at each confidence threshold along the x-axis, we evaluate SIS size in Figure 5 on the set of images
that originally were classified with at least that level of confidence). We find that as one would hope, model confidence is
uniformly lower on the misclassified inputs.
(a) CIFAR-10 test set (b) CIFAR-10-C test set
Figure S3: Mean confidence of correctly vs. incorrectly classified images for each corresponding SIS threshold we evaluate
in Figure 5 across the (a) CIFAR-10 test set and (b) our random sample of the CIFAR-10-C test set. Shaded region indicates
95% confidence interval.
S4. Details of Human Classification Benchmark
Here we include additional details on our benchmark of human classification accuracy of sparse pixel subsets (Section 3.4).
Figure S4 shows all images shown to users (100 images each for 5%, 30% and 50% pixel-subsets of CIFAR-10 test images).
Each set of 100 images has pixel-subsets stemming from each of the three architectures roughly equally (35 ResNet20, 35
ResNet18, 30 VGG16). Figure S5 depicts the correlation between human classification accuracy and pixel-subset size.
(a) 5% Pixel-Subsets (b) 30% Pixel-Subsets
(c) 50% Pixel-Subsets
Figure S4: Pixel-subsets of CIFAR-10 test images shown to participants in our human classification benchmark (Section 3.4).
Figure S5: Human classification accuracy on a sample of CIFAR-10 test image pixel-subsets (see Section 3.4).
S5. Scaling SIS to ImageNet
It is computationally infeasible to scale the original backward selection procedure of SIS [4] to ImageNet. As each
ImageNet image contains 299 × 299 = 89401 pixels, running backward selection to find one SIS for an image would
require ∼ 4 billion forward passes through the network. Here we introduce a more efficient gradient-based approximation to
the original SIS procedure (via Batched Gradient SIScollection, Batched Gradient BackSelect, and Batched Gradient
FindSIS) that allows us to find SIS on larger ImageNet images in a reasonable time. The Batched Gradient SIScollection
procedure described below identifies a complete collection of disjoint masks for an input x, where each mask M specifies a
pixel-subset of the input xS = x (1−M) such that f(xS ≥ τ). Here f outputs the probability assigned by the network to
its predicted class (i.e., its confidence).
The idea behind our approximation algorithm is two-fold: (1) Instead of separately masking every remaining pixel to find
the least critical pixel (whose masking least reduces the confidence in the network’s prediction), we use the gradient with
respect to the mask as a means of ordering. (2) Instead of masking just 1 pixel at every iteration, we mask larger subsets of
pixels in each iteration. More formally, let x be an image of dimensions H ×W × C where H is the height, W the width,
and C the channel. Let f(x) be the network’s confidence on image x and τ the target SIS confidence threshold. Recall
that we only compute SIS for images where f(x) ≥ τ . Let M be the mask with dimensions H ×W with 0 indicating an
unmasked feature (pixel) and 1 indicating a masked feature. We initialize M as all 0s (all features unmasked). At iteration i,
we compute the gradient of f with respect to the input pixels and mask∇M = ∇Mf(x (1−M)). Here M is the current
mask updated after each iteration. In each iteration, we find the block of k features to mask, G∗, chosen in descending order
by value of entries in ∇M . The mask is updated after each iteration by masking this block of k features until all features
have been masked. Given p input features, our Batched Gradient SIScollection procedure returns j sufficient input subsets
in O( pk · j) evaluations of∇f (as opposed to O(p2j) evaluations of f in the original SIS procedure [4]).
We use k = 100 in this paper, which allows us to find one SIS for each of 32 ImageNet images (i.e., a mini-batch) in∼1-2
minutes using Batched Gradient FindSIS. Note that while our algorithm is an approximate procedure, the pixel-subsets
produced are real sufficient input subsets, that is they always satisfy f(xS ≥ τ). For CIFAR-10 images (which are smaller
in size), we use the original SIS procedure from [4]. For both datasets, we treat all channels of each pixel as a single feature.
Batched Gradient SIScollection(f , x, τ , k)
M = 0
for j = 1, 2, . . . do
R = Batched Gradient BackSelect(f,x,M, k)
Mj = Batched Gradient FindSIS(f,x, τ, R)
M ←M +Mj
if f(x (1−M)) < τ : return M1,...,Mj−1
end
Batched Gradient BackSelect(f , x, M , k)
R = empty stack
while M 6= 1 do
G∗ = Topk (∇Mf(x (1−M))
Update M ←M +G∗
Push G∗ onto top of R
end
return R
Batched Gradient FindSIS(f , x, τ , R)
M = 1
while f(x (1−M)) < τ do
Pop G from top of R
Update M ←M −G
end
if f(x (1−M)) ≥ τ : return M
else: return None
Additional Examples of SIS on ImageNet
Figure S6 shows additional examples of SIS (threshold = 0.9) on ImageNet images (see Section 4.1.1).
Figure S6: Examples of SIS (threshold = 0.9) from the ImageNet validation set (top row of each block). The middle rows
show the location of the SIS pixels (red) and the bottom rows show the image with all pixels outside of the SIS masked,
which is still classified by the Inception-v3 model with ≥ 90% confidence.
